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NOTES
CONDITIONAL WILLS
There has been a considerable amount of litigation in South Caro-
lina on last wills and testaments, yet the precise problem of a con-
ditional will has never been presented squarely to the Court until
the recent case of Capps v. Richardson, 53 S. E. (2d) 876 (S. C. 1949).
Briefly, the facts in the case are these: The testator executed a will
which contained only two provisions other than the formal matters.
"ITEM 1: Whereas, I am indebted to Draytford Richardson, as is
evidenced by a mortgage bearing equal date with these presents, and
whereas on account of the amount now due and in order to save any
foreclosure proceeding of the said mortgage in the case of my death,
I hereby will, devise and bequeath unto the said Draytford Richardson
all of the property, real or personal, of which I may die seized. ITEM 2:
I hereby nominate, constitute and appoint my sister Mrs. Willie Richard-
son as Executrix of this Will, she to serve as such without Bond." The
beneficiary of the sole dispositive provision of the will was the son of
the sister, who was appointed executrix. The testator paid off the
note and mortgage to Draytford Richardson in 1943 and died some
three years later in 1946. The will was admitted to probate in common
form and the complaint in this action was filed before a year had
elapsed. The theory of the complaint was that the will was conditional
or contingent, and on failure of the contingency, the will was void and
the heirs and distributees were entitled to take from the decedent
under the Statute of Descent and Distribution. The defendants denied
this and set out the intention of the decedent that Richardson should
take the property anyhow. The case was referred for the taking of
testimony followed by a hearing at Chambers before Judge Lide. Judge
Lide held that the will was conditional yet declared the will to be ef-
fective to the extent of the appointment of the executrix. On appeal
to the Supreme Court, the decree was unanimously affirmed. Mr.
Justice Oxner in the opinion goes into the matter of conditional wills
at great length and cites ample authority for his conclusion. Citing
57 Am. Jur., Wills, Section 671, the Court says, "A conditional or
contingent will is one which is dependent for its operation upon the
happening of a specified condition or contingency. If the condition
fails, the will is inoperative and void thereafter, unless it is repub-
lished." The Court further quoted from Corpus Juris as follows:
"Whether a will is to be regarded as contingent turns upon the point
whether the contingency is referred to merely as the occasion of or
reason for making the particular disposition of property which is pro-
vided for, and is intended to specify the condition upon which the will
is to become operative, it being only in the latter case that the will is
contingent." 68 C. J., Wills, Section 256, page 631.
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Yet this writer is concerned as to the reasoning behind this opinion
in the light of the cases on this particular topic. There are a great
many cases like that of Eaton v. Brown, 193 U. S. 411 (1904). There,
the testator, about to depart on a journey into peril or engage in some
hazardous enterprise, makes a statement to that effect saying, "If I
do not return, this is my last will and testament." The issue is plain.
Was this intended to be a contingency or condition precedent to the
operation of the will or was this merely a statement of the purpose
or motive behind the execution of the will? The cases rest largely on
the factual situation presented in each controversy and it is not the
bone of contention here, though it seems plain that the testator's will
in the principal case was contingent. The more important facet of the
dilemma is the effect of the failure of the contingency. In French v.
French, 14 W. Va. 458 (1877), the prior cases are exhaustively re-
viewed including Jacks v. Henderson, 1 DeSaussure 543 (1797). The
court held that the language, "If I die before my return from my
journey to Ireland", was a contingency which affected the whole will
and the entire will was ineffectual.
In Dougherty v. Holscheider, 40 Tex. Cv. A. 31, 88 S. W. 1113
(1905), the court said, "A will which is to become effective only upon
the happening of a contingency is a contingent will, and in case the
contingency does not arise is by the failure of the happening of the
event annulled and revoked." The point is concisely stated in Morrow's
Appeal, 116 Pa. 440, 9 Atl. 660 (1887). "No text writer seems to have
distinguished between a condition attached to particular testamentary
disposition and a condition attached to the operation of the instrument."
Damon v. Damon, 8 Allen 192 (Mass. 1864) is to the same effect,
where the distinction was clearly drawn between a conditional will
which is void in its entirety on failure of the condition and a contingent
disposition which is invalid, the remaining portion of the will being
valid. Finally, in the very case cited as authority by Mr. Justice Oxner,
the court made this statement: "A conditional or contingent will takes
effect as a will only on the happening of a specified contingency, which
is a condition precedent to the operation of the will." Barber v. Bar-
ber, 368 Ill. 215, 13 N. E. (2d) 257 (1938). The inescapable conclusion
from these cases is that once having decided the will is a contingent
will and that the contingency has failed, it is idle to talk of other
effectual provisions of that instrument. If the will is contingent, and
the contingency has failed, the entire will is void and of no effect.
The case of Jacks v. Henderson, supra, is not at all clear and the most
that can be gleaned from its muddy waters is a recognition of the
doctrine regarding contingent wills.
An example of a conditional provision in a will is to be found in
Shuman v. Heldman, 63 S. C. 474, 41 S.E. 510 (1902), where the
testator attached a condition precedent to a devise in remainder. The
devisee failed in her performance and subsequent remaindermen, named
by the testator in the event of such failure, took under the will.
In the instant case the better view would seem to be the theory
followed in the complaint. The will was conditional. The condition failed.
Therefore, the entire will was void and the respondents were entitled
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to take the property in distributive shares as intestate property. The
case also gives rise to an interesting speculation in the field of mort-
gages. Under the doctrine of "Once a mortgage, always a mortgage"
would the Court have held the disposition to be a security transaction
if the debt had not been paid?
In the light of the foregoing analysis, there is another question
which must receive consideration in litigation of conditional wills.
Whether or not the will is contingent is a matter of construction.
The crucial query is whether this should be done in the Probate Court
or the Circuit Court. There is a division among the Courts of this
country and until the question arises directly in South Carolina, it
must remain a moot one.
JOHN W. LINDSAY
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